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1 Introduction
The economic consequences of xed production costs have been largely neglected in the litera-
ture, analyzing input market transactions. In the respective literature, input prices are typically
determined at the margin, i.e., by the interaction of upstream rmssupply functions and down-
stream rmsderived demand functions. Even when bargaining between vertically related rms
is considered, contractual outcomes rely on the rmsmarginal contributionto the bilateral
surpluses (Inderst and Sha¤er 2009). These approaches remain silent about how xed produc-
tion costs are shared across the vertically related rms and how they a¤ect the terms of contracts
and the market outcome.1
The consideration of xed production costs, however, has become increasingly relevant as
public regulations have imposed considerable additional xed costs on many manufacturing
rms. This is particularly true for the food industry, where food scares such as the periodical
outbreaks of foodborne illness caused by pathogens2 have fueled public concern about food
safety.3 As a consequence, public regulations have been tightened to ensure the quality of
products and services. In addition, the number of ISO certications (either publicly required or
voluntarily implemented) in many industries has grown exponentially in recent years (see ISO
2012). Compliance with these standards induce signicant additional costs for producers, tracing
back to the need for (supplementary) quality control technologies such as product inspection
and testing, process controls and various audits. In particular, extra labor has to be employed
1This may trace back to the fact that in many vertical structures, upstream xed cost do not a¤ect market
outcomes. Consider an upstream monopolist, which delivers to an oligopolistic retail sector, upstream xed costs
do not a¤ect the market outcome as long as prot sharing allows to cover the upstream xed costs. The same
holds for xed costs borne by an oligopolistic upstream sector, which supplies a common retailer.
2Every year, approximately 42,000 cases of salmonellosis are reported in the United States (see Centers for
Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/general/, November 19th, 2013). In May 2011,
a major outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli occurred in Germany, which resulted in about 4,000
ill people and in the death of more than 56 people (see EFSA Journal 2013, 11(1), 3025).
3For example, to foster the integrated management of foodborne hazards from farm-to-fork, the U.S. enacted
the mandated use of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP). The HACCP system identies
specic hazards and measures for their control to ensure the safety of food along the entire production process (for a
detailed description, see the Codex Alimentarius of the FAO/WHO). In the European Union, the implementation
of the HACCP system became mandatory for food industries in 1995 (EU Directive 93/43).
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to manage the daily tasks of documentation (Bain and Busch 2004).4 Note that these additional
production costs are only incurred if production actually takes place, without depending on the
total quantity produced (Antle 2000). In other words, producers bear substantial inframarginal
or xed operating costs when complying with the more and more demanding public or private
(quality) standards.
We consider a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream rms (suppliers) that
compete to deliver a homogenous good to a di¤erentiated downstream duopoly (retailers).5
The upstream rms make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the retailers either in the form of simple
linear or two-part tari¤ contracts6 and incur a xed cost if production actually takes place.
Within this framework, we show that xed costs a¤ect both input market contracting and nal
goods prices. Most importantly, we nd that xed costs may help to monopolize an imperfectly
competitive downstream market and, thus translate into higher consumer prices.
Our results depend on the nature of contracts. Perfect competition among upstream pro-
ducers implies two equilibrium properties: rst, any upstream producer makes zero prot and
second, both retailers select a common supplier even though they are di¤erentiated. In the case
of linear contracts, the equilibrium wholesale prices are increasing in the amount of the xed
cost, because the upstream rms margins need to cover that xed cost. Under two-part tari¤
contracts, however, a su¢ ciently high xed cost enables the retailers to monopolize the market.
As the retailers select a common supplier that internalizes all externalities, the industry prot
4The food safety related expenditures, in particular for implementing HACCP systems, amount to approxi-
mately 1% to 7% of the production value (cf. Ragasa et al. 2011).
5This corresponds to the observed structure in many markets. Food industries, for example, are characterized
by a large bunge of upstream rms producing almost homogeneous goods, which they deliver to more and more
concentrated processors or retailers (OECD 1998; EU 1999; FTC 2001).
6This mirrors the observation that in some industries simple linear contracts are used, while in others trade
is based on more complex contracts. The assumption of non-linear tari¤s accounts for the fact that vertical
relations in intermediate goods markets are often based on more complex contracts than simple linear pricing
rules (Rey and Vergé, 2008). Analyzing the yoghurt market in the U.S., Villas-Boas (2007) provides evidence for
the existence of non-linear pricing schemes in retailing. In particular, she states that [t]he manufacturer extracts
revenue from retailers via a xed fee or by selling the non-marginal units at higher wholesale prices(Villas-Boas,
2007, p. 646). Furthermore, Bonnet and Dubois (2010, p. 141) nd for the French bottled water market that
manufacturers and retailers use nonlinear pricing contracts and in particular two-part tari¤ contracts with resale
price maintenance.
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is maximized. In contrast to the general presumption that two-part tari¤ contracts are more
e¢ cient than linear contracts,7 we nd that two-part tari¤ contracts may well lead to higher
consumer prices than linear contracts.
The identied anticompetitive e¤ects of two-part tari¤ contracts are in line with the ndings
of Sha¤er (1991). In a similar industry structure but without considering any xed costs at
the upstream level, he shows that the competing upstream rms charge a wholesale price above
marginal cost to soften downstream competition. The rents are redistributed to the retailers
via negative xed fees (slotting allowances). However, in Sha¤er (1991) the monopoly solution
can never be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. We show instead that monopolization in
fact becomes possible when considering xed costs at the upstream level. Upstream xed costs
imply that the retailers necessarily buy from a common supplier, which maximizes the industry
surplus.
Thereby, a retailers incentive to deviate to an alternative supplier in order to free-ride on
the contract of its rival retailer remains an issue. However, the existence of upstream xed costs
reduces each retailers incentive to deviate since the deviating retailer has to bear the entire xed
costs of the alternative supplier. As a consequence, monopolization of the downstream industry
can be an equilibrium for su¢ ciently high xed costs. Our results do not depend on the nature
of downstream competition. In contrast to Sha¤er (1991), where the anticompetitive e¤ect of
two-part tari¤s relies on Bertrand competition among di¤erentiated retailers, our insights also
hold under Cournot competition in the downstream market, where the output decisions are
strategic substitutes.
There is a wide literature on how vertical contracting a¤ects market outcomes.8 In a recent
7 In vertical structures with either an upstream monopoly and a downstream oligopoly or an upstream oligopoly
and a downstream monopoly, the vertically related rms do not internalize the impact of their individual decisions
on the overall industry prot when supply is based on linear contracts. This problem of double marginalization
results in too high consumer prices which do not maxmize overall industry prot. As is well-known, it can be
overcome by two-part tari¤ contracts.
8See Bonanno and Vickers (1988) as well Rey and Stiglitz (1988) as seminal references. More recently, Miklós-
Thal et al. (2011) show that monopolization of the industry is an equilibrium when the retailerso¤ers can be
contingent on the relationship being exclusive or not. Studying a model where a dominant supplier distributes its
product through retailers that also sell substitute products from a competitive fringe, Inderst and Sha¤er (2010)
nd as well that the industry prot can be maximized when the contracts used are market-share contracts, i.e.,
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paper, Rey and Whinston (2013), study a model of vertical contracting between a manufacturer
and two retailers. They show that when retailers can o¤er a menu of three-part tari¤s, there
is always an equilibrium in which no exclusion occurs and industry prots are maximized. In
contrast, we pursue a di¤erent approach. We do not examine the monopolizing e¤ects resulting
from di¤erent contracting arrangements, but we explain industry monopolization by exogenous
xed costs. We also contribute to the small literature that deals with food safety standards
in food supply chains. This literature deals mainly with the question of how those private
standards are chosen.9 We, instead, take the existence as well as the adoption of either public
or private standards as given in order to consider the implications in vertically related markets
of the associated compliance costs for the contracting and, nally, consumer prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our theoreti-
cal framework and characterize the monopoly outcome to provide an appropriate benchmark.
Section 3 contains the equilibrium analysis if linear contracts are used. In Section 4, we study
the case of non-linear contracts. In Section 5, we illustrate our results using a linear example.
Finally, we discuss our results and conclude (sections 5 and 6).
2 The Model
Consider a perfectly competitive upstream industry, which produces a homogeneous good, and
two di¤erentiated retailers i = 1; 2; which sell to nal consumers.10 The upstream rms produce
at constant marginal cost, c  0. In addition, each upstream manufacturer bears a xed cost
K  0 if production actually takes place.11 The xed cost K is neither scale-dependant nor
a retailer receives discounts according to its total purchases.
9See, for example, Bazoche et al. (2005), Giraud-Héraud et al. (2006). More recently, von Schlippenbach and
Teichmann (2012) show that the observed di¤erence in private quality standards could be a result of retailers
strategy to increase their bargaining position vis-à-vis suppliers.
10Note that the upstream rms may represent primary producers, while the downstream rms may also char-
acterize processors or retailers whose businesses depend on the input of the upstream rm. The di¤erentiation of
downstream rms represents the brand or store preferences of consumers.
11This may correspond to costs induced by compliance with public or private regulations. Under certied
production, for example, xed operating costs include costs for regular audits, administration costs and training
of employees.
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retailer-specic. The costs of the retailers (except procurement costs) are normalized to zero.
We further assume that the upstream rms have prohibitively high costs to sell directly to
consumers.
We consider a three-stage game. First, the manufacturers make simultaneous contract o¤ers
to the retailers, where they are allowed to discriminate between the retailers. Second, the
retailers observe all contract o¤ers and decide from which manufacturer they will exclusively
buy. Finally, the retailers compete noncooperatively in prices. The game is solved by backward
induction where our equilibrium concept refers to subgame perfection.
We consider two di¤erent types of vertical contracts: i) a contract only consisting of a linear
wholesale price wi and ii) a two-part tari¤ contract (wi; Fi), entailing a linear wholesale price
wi and a xed fee Fi. The xed payment can be positive, zero or negative, whereas a negative
xed fee indicates a slotting fee paid by the manufacturer to the retailer. We do not allow
for contracts that are contingent on the rival retailer-supplier pairs contract. Furthermore, we
assume that each retailer-supplier pair may agree on an exclusivity clause in order to avoid
a retailer accepting the payment of slotting allowances without stocking the manufacturers
product.
Each retailer i faces a demand function Di(P ); where P = (P1; P2) indicates the vector
of retail prices. Demand is twice di¤erentiable and downward-sloping with @PiDi(P ) < 0 <
@PjDi(P ). Let Ri(P ) = (Pi   wi)Di (P ) denote the retailer is ow prot when it sells at a price
Pi and the rival retailer j 6= i sells at Pj : The retailer is total prot is given by i(P ) = Ri(P ) 
Fi. The following assumptions ensure a well-behaved price competition problem which brings
about a unique Nash equilibrium (see Sha¤er 1991): i) @2PiRi(P ) < 0 is a necessary condition
for prot maximization; ii) @2PiPjRi(P ) > 0 ensures that each retailer is reaction function is
upward sloping; iii)  := @2PiRi(P )@
2
PjRj(P )   @2PiPjRi(P )@2PjPiRj(P ) > @PjDi(P )@2PiPjRi(P )
guarantees both uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and also ensures that each retailer is
equilibrium marginal return decreases in its marginal cost wi.
We now characterize the equilibrium retail prices. In the last stage of the game, both retailers
set their prices so as to maximize their prots. The corresponding rst-order conditions are given
by:
@Pii(P ) = (Pi   wi) @PiDi(P ) +Di(P ) = 0, (1)
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whose solution yields the equilibrium prices P (w1; w2) = (P 1 (w1; w2) ; P 2 (w1; w2)): For ease of
exposition, we use the simplied notation P i := P

i (w1; w2) and P
 := P (w1; w2). Comparative
statics reveal that an increase of the retailer is wholesale price wi results in an increase of both
retail prices:
@P i
@wi
=
@2PjRj(P
)@PiDi(P )

> 0 (2)
and,
@P j
@wi
=  
@2PjPiRj(P
)@PiDi(P )

> 0. (3)
Using the equilibrium retail prices P (w1; w2), we derive the wholesale prices that maximize the
industry prot. The reduced form of the overall gross industry prot is given by:
 (w1; w2) = (P

1   c)D1 (P ) + (P 2   c)D2 (P ) . (4)
Maximizing (4) with respect to wi, we obtain:
@ (w1; w2)
@wi
=

(P i   c)@PiDi(P ) +Di(P ) + (P j   c)@PiDj(P )

@wiP

i (5)
+

(P i   c)@PjDi(P ) + (P j   c)@PjDj(P ) +Dj(P )

@wiP

j = 0,
which simplies to:
@ (w1; w2)
@wi
= (wi   c) @PiDi(P )@wiP i + (P i   c)@PjDi(P )@wiP j (6)
+ (wj   c) @PjDj(P )@wiP j +
 
P j   c

@PjDj(P
)@wiP

i = 0.
Solving the respective equation system for w1 and w2, we get the equilibrium wholesale
prices wM = (wM1 ; w
M
2 ), which maximize the overall industry prot. The optimal wholesale
prices are such that the nal product prices P  (w1; w2) are raised to the level a fully integrated
monopolist would choose.12 In the following, the equilibrium wholesale prices wM will be used
as a benchmark.
12A monopolist sets the prices P1 and P2 as to maximize
P
i(Pi   c)Di(P ); which leads to the rst-order
conditions (Pi   c)@PiDi(P ) +Di(P ) + (Pj   c)@PiDj(P ) = 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i. Inspecting the expressions
in the rectangular brackets on the right-hand side of (5), we nd that the optimal wholesale prices wM also fulll
the rst-order conditions of an integrated monopolist.
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3 Linear Contracts
We start with the analysis of linear contracts. In the second stage of the game, retailers observe
all contract o¤ers and select the most protable o¤ers. At the same time, manufacturers will not
o¤er contracts that earn them negative prots. As suppliers incur xed costs K and perfectly
compete for exclusively supplying the retailers, the latter will decide to purchase from a com-
mon supplier in equilibrium. The common supplier sets wholesale prices to solve the following
maximization problem:
max
w1;w2
P2
i=1(P

i (w1; w2)  wi)Di(P (w1; w2)) s. t.
P2
i=1(wi   c)Di(P (w1; w2)) K  0.
As retail prots decrease in wholesale prices, the constraint of the common supplier to earn
non-negative prots is binding. Using symmetric retailers, the symmetric equilibrium wholesale
prices are, thus, implicitly given by:13
wL1 = w
L
2 = w
L = c+
K
D1(P  (wL; wL)) +D2(P  (wL; wL))
. (7)
The equilibrium wholesale price is equal to the marginal cost of production plus a margin which
increases linearly with the level of the xed cost K. The margin corresponds to the xed cost
K devided by the total sales. An increase of the xed cost K leads to raising wholesale prices
for fullling the manufacturers zero-prot condition. In the absence of any xed costs, the
wholesale prices are set equal to marginal cost (see Proposition 1 in: Sha¤er 1991).
There exists an upper bound of the xed cost, K, which can be a¤orded by the upstream
manufacturer. Using symmetry, the maximum value corresponds to the maximized prot of a
single supplier which serves both retailers; i.e., K :=
P2
i=1(w
max   c)Di(P (wmax; wmax)) with:
wmax := arg max
w1;w2
P2
i=1(wi   c)Di(P (w1; w2)).
It is obvious that wL can never exceed wmax and, thus, there exists no equilibrium when K > K.
Proposition 1 In the case of linear contracts, both retailers can receive the same equilibrium
wholesale price wL which is given by (7). wL is monotonically increasing in K in the interval
K 2 (0;K], with wL = 0 at K = 0 and wL = wmax at K = K. Moreover, there exists a
13As other couples of wholesale prices fulll the manufacturers zero-prot condition, there also exists asym-
metric equilibria with wL1 6= wL2 .
8
unique threshold value bK := P2i=1(wMi   c)Di(P (wM1 ; wM2 )) such that wL > wM (wL  wM )
for K > bK (K  bK).
Proof. To prove the last part of Proposition 1, we evaluate (6) for wi = wmaxi , which gives the
requirement:
@ (w1; w2)
@wi

wi=wmaxi
= (P i   wi)@PjDi(P )@wiP j + (P j   wj)@PiDj(P )@wiP i  Di(P ) < 0.
Using Di(P ) =   (P i   wi) @PiDi(P ); we get:
@ (w1; w2)
@wi

wi=wmaxi
= (P i   wi)
 
@PjDi(P
)@wiP

j + @PiDi(P
)

+ (P j   wj)@PiDj(P )@wiP i < 0.
Using (2) and (3) and rearranging terms, we can re-write the last equation as:
@ (w1; w2)
@wi

wi=wmaxi
=
(P i   wi)

  @PjDi(P )@2PjPiRj(P )

+ (P j   wj)@PiDj(P )| {z }
>0
@2PjRj(P
)| {z }
<0
< 0.
Applying symmetry, we obtain:
  @PjDi(P )@2PjPiRj(P ) + @PiDj(P )@2PjRj(P ) < 0
because of
@2PjRj(P
)  @2PjPiRj(P )

@2PjRj(P
) + @2PjPiRj(P
)

<  (@2PjRj(P ) @2PjPiRj(P ))@PjDi(P )
which reduces to @2PjRj(P
) + @2PjPiRj(P
) <  @PjDi(P ).
If the equilibrium wholesale price equals wM , the industry prot is maximized. As rents
can only be transferred via the linear wholesale price, parts of the overall industry prot cannot
be shifted to the supplier. This implies that the maximum xed costs the supplier can cover
are necessarily lower than the monopoly industry outcome, i.e., K < 
 
wM1 ; w
M
2

: Our results
further reveal that for all K > bK := P2i=1(wMi   c)Di(P (wM1 ; wM2 )) the equilibrium wholesale
price exceeds the wholesale price that ensures the monopoly outcome, i.e., wL > wM .
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4 Non-linear Contracts
We now assume that the upstream manufacturers o¤er non-linear contracts in the form of two-
part tari¤contracts (wi; Fi) to the retailers. Each retailer purchases from the supplier it earns the
highest prot with. In equilibrium, both retailers buy from the same supplier due to the existence
of upstream xed costs. The manufacturers o¤er contracts (wi; Fi) to both retailers which
maximize the industry surplus subject to earning non-negative prot. Equilibrium contracts
have to be immune against bilateral deviation of one of the retailers with an alternative supplier.
We show the existence of an equilibrium, where the common supplier proposes a wholesale
price wMi which maximizes the industry prot, and uses the xed fee to redistribute the joint
surplus to the respective retailer. Suppose that the corresponding xed fee is given by:
FMi = Ri
 
P 
 
wM1 ; w
M
2
  i    wM1 ; wM2  K ;
where i 2 [0; 1] (with i + j = 1; 8i = 1; 2; j 6= i) indicates how the industry prot is shared
among the retailers. Such a two-part tari¤ (wMi ; F
M
i ) constitutes an equilibrium contract if an
alternative supplier cannot propose a better o¤er to any retailer j 6= i leading to a unilateral
deviation by that retailer. We denote by
Dj
 
wMi ; w
BR
j (w
M
i )

=
 
P j
 
wMi ; w
BR
j (w
M
i )
  cDj  P   wMi ; wBRj (wMi )
the joint prot of a retailer j 6= i and an alternative supplier without considering the xed
costs, where wBRj (w
M
i ) denotes the best-response to the wholesale price w
M
i , i.e.:
wBRj (w
M
i ) := arg maxwj
 
P j
 
wMi ; wj
  cDj  P   wMi ; wj	 .
Hence, (wMi ; F
M
i ) is an equilibrium contract if:
Rj
 
P 
 
wM1 ; w
M
2
  F j = (1  i)   wM1 ; wM2  K  Dj  wMi ; wBRj (wMi ) K; (8)
which simplies to the condition:
K 
Dj

wMi ; w
BR
j (w
M
i )

  (1  i)
 
wM1 ; w
M
2

i
: (9)
Note that Dj

wMi ; w
BR
j (w
M
i )

< 
 
wM1 ; w
M
2

. A larger value ofK makes a unilateral deviation
less attractive as the deviating retailer must cover the entire xed costs of the alternative supplier.
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The monopoly industry outcome is, therefore, more likely to be an equilibrium the higher the
xed costs of the upstream industry. In detail, for any K  eK := 2Dj wMi ; wBRj (wMi )  

 
wM1 ; w
M
2

; there exists a symmetric equilibrium, where both retailers earn an equal share of
the overall industry prot, i.e.
 

 
wM1 ; w
M
2
 K =2 and, thus, the monopoly outcome in the
downstream market can always be sustained.14 This equilibrium is unique for K = eK.15 We
get multiplicity of equilibria for K > eK; and the range of feasible sharing rules in equilibrium is
increasing in K: Note, for K  Dj

wMi ; w
BR
j (w
M
i )

; all sharing possibilities among retailers,
i.e. i 2 [0; 1] ; constitute an equilibrium. This implies that it is even possible that one retailer
gets the full industry prot, while its upstream competitor ends up with zero prot.
Under two-part tari¤ contracts, the vertically related rms can make use of two instruments.
For K  eK, the supplier charges a wholesale price wM that ensures the monopoly industry
outcome. The xed fee is used to transfer rents to the downstream rms up to the level where
the suppliers prot cover the xed costs. For eK  K < bK, the xed fees are negative as the
upstream ow prot exceeds K; i.e.
P2
i=1(w
M
i  c)Di(P (wM1 ; wM2 ))  K. For K > bK, however,
the suppliers ow prot does not cover the xed cost. To ensure the suppliers participation
constraint, the retailers have to pay xed fees in order to shift at least part of their rents to the
supplier in order to ensure its zero-prot constraint.
For relatively low values of the xed cost, i.e., K < eK, the monopoly industry outcome
under two-part tari¤s is not an equilibrium. As the incentive constraint given in (8) is binding,
the equilibrium wholesale prices wT1 (K) = w
T
2 (K) = w
T (K) are, thus, implicitly given in case
of symmetric retailers by the highest wholesale prices satisfying:

 
wT1 (K); w
T
2 (K)
 K
2
= Dj
 
wTi (K); w
BR
j (w
T
i (K))
 K.
Note that this symmetric equilibrium implying an equal distribution of the industry prot among
the retailers is unique for all K < eK: An asymmetric equilibrium is not possible because an
14Schutz (2012) questions the existence of an equilibrium in Sha¤er (1991) for the case of non-linear contracts.
To the contrary, the equilibrium we highlight for K  eK is immune to multilateral deviations as considered
by Schutz. This is due to the fact that the equilibrium contract implies the monopolization of the industry for
K  eK.
15An asymmetric distribution of the overall prot among retailers would require a lower equilibrium wholesale
price to ensure non-deviation of the retailer that gets the lower share. Correspondingly, the symmetric equilibrium
is payo¤-dominant and, thus, the unique equilibrium.
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unequal distribution of prots among retailers would lead to stronger deviation incentives of the
low-prot retailer resulting in lower wholesale prices and, thus, a lower overall industry prot.16
The equilibrium contracts are, thus, given by wT1 (K) = w
T
2 (K) = w
T (K) and F T (K) =
Ri
 
P 
 
wT1 (K); w
T
2 (K)
   12    wT1 (K); wT2 (K) K. The existence of such an equilibrium
requires that the realized industry prots, 
 
wT1 (K); w
T
2 (K)

, are larger than K. Note further
that the wholesale price wTi (K) is monotonically increasing in K as:
@
@K


 
wT1 (K); w
T
2 (K)
  2Dj  wTi (K); wBRj (wTi (K))+K	 > 0
holds everywhere. The equilibrium gross industry surplus is, thus, increasing in K.
Obviously, slotting allowances emerge in equilibrium when the wholesale prices lead to up-
stream ow prots exceedingK. Then, the common supplier has to transfer rents to the retailers
by lump-sum payments inducing a negative xed fee. This allows wholesale prices to be higher
under two-part tari¤ contracts than under linear contracts. Under linear tari¤s, the upstream
rm charges the lowest possible wholesale price to its buyers as there is no second instrument
to transfer rents between the vertically related rms. This nding contradicts the general pre-
sumption that non-linear contracts are more e¢ cient than linear contracts in vertical relations.
However, if slotting allowances are banned, the common supplier cannot transfer rents to
the retailers by lump-sum payments. In this case, if the ban is binding, the wholesale prices
are the same under both contracting regimes. If the ban is not binding, wholesale prices under
two-part tari¤s undercut the wholesale prices under linear tari¤s as the upstream gross prot
plus the xed fees are used to cover the xed cost. Our results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 Industry monopolization arises as an equilibrium outcome whenever K  eK.
For K = eK, there exists a unique equilibrium; while for K > eK; there exist multiple equilibria
with alternative sharing rules. For lower values of K, i.e., K < eK, industry monopolization is
not an equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium wholesale price wT (K) satises:
2D
 
wT (K); wBR(wT (K))
   wT (K); wT (K) = K
to avoid unilateral deviation. Existence of such an equilibrium requires K    wT (K); wT (K).
16We can dene other potential equilibria based on di¤erent sharing rules of the industry prots where non-
deviation of retailers is ensured. However, these potential equilibria are strictly pareto-dominated by the presented
equilibrium, in which the xed costs are equally shared between retailers.
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5 Example: Linear demand
To illustrate our results, we apply linear demand functions and set the suppliers marginal cost
of production to zero, i.e., c = 0. Consistent with our assumptions, the inverse demand functions
Pi (q1; q2) are given by:
Pi (q1; q2) = 1  qi   qj , i = 1; 2, j 6= i, (10)
where  2 (0; 1) indicates how substitutable the retailers are from a consumer perspective.
The higher  the higher the degree of substitutability. Solving the system of inverse demand
functions (see (10)), we get the following demand functions:
Di (p1; p2) =
1
1 + 
  1
1  2 pi +

1  2 pj .
The retailers set their prices so as to maximize their prots, which yields:
P i (w1; w2) =
2(1 + wi) + wj   (1 + )
4  2 .
In the following, we derive the wholesale prices under the two di¤erent contracting regimes.
Note as a benchmark that the monopoly industry outcome is sustained for wM = =2 implying
a monopoly industry prot of:
(wM1 ; w
M
2 ) = 
M =
1
2(1 + )
.
Linear contracts. Note rst that the equilibrium wholesale price equals marginal cost if the
xed cost equals zero, i.e., wL = 0 for K = 0. Using our assumptions and applying condition
(7), the equilibrium wholesale price for linear contracts is given by:
wL(K) =
1
2

1 
q
1  2K  2 +    2 Q wM .
That is, the common supplier that delivers to the two retailers always makes zero prot. Corre-
spondingly, the wholesale price wL exceeds the wholesale price wM that ensures the monopoly
outcome for:
K > bK := P2i=1(wMi   c)Di(P (wM1 ; wM2 )) = 2 + 2 .
Note that the maximum cost that can be a¤orded is given by:
K := max
wi;wj
P2
i=1(wi   c)Di(P ) =
1
4 + 2   22 .
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That is, in the interval K 2 (K;M ], the suppliers ow prot never covers the xed cost, so
that trade can never occur. Because of the double marginalization problem, a xed cost larger
than K can never be covered.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes under linear contracts depending on the value
of K and the product di¤erentiation parameter . In the interval [0;K], a trade-equilibrium
exists: while in the interval [ bK;K], the xed cost is so high that the equilibrium wholesale price
exceeds the industry maximizing wholesale price, for K < bK; however, the wholesale price is
below the industry maximizing level.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
no equilibrium in K
wLÝKÞ < wM
wLÝKÞ > wM
K
K
EM
K
K
Figure 1: Equilibria under Linear Tari¤s
As illustrated in Figure 2,17 the retail prices are increasing in K: A su¢ ciently high xed cost
causes a price increase of more than one-half compared to a case where no xed costs are incurred
by the upstream rm. Interestingly, a higher degree of downstream competition tends to raise
the nal product price for a given value of the upstream rms xed costs K.
17We restrict attention to values of K, which are lower than the equilibrium industry surplus for K = 0, i.e.,
 (0; 0).
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Figure 2: Comparison of Retail Prices for K > 0 and K = 0
under Linear Tari¤s
Two-part tari¤ contracts. We rst determine the deviation prot of a retailer when it
purchases from another supplier. The best alternative o¤er of a rival supplier maximizes the
deviating retailers prot, taking the wholesale price of the other supplier-retailer pair as given.
Let us dene the wholesale price of the deviating supplier-retailer pair as:
wBRj (w
M
i ) := arg maxwj
 
P 
 
wMi ; wj
  cDj  P   wMi ; wj	 .
The solution to this maximization problem is given by:
wBRj (w
M
i ) =
2
 
4  2   2
8
 
2  2 .
The corresponding retailer prot is given by:
Dj (w
M
i ; w
BR
j (w
M
i )) =
 
4  2   22
32
 
2  32 + 4 .
Thus, we get monopolization of the industry prot if:
K  eK := 2Dj (wM ; wBRj (wMi ))   wM ; wM =  4  2   22
16
 
2  32 + 4   12 (1 + ) .
The more substitutable the products are, the more protable is the deviation strategy; thus, to
prevent unilateral deviation K has to be su¢ ciently large. In other words, eK is increasing in
15
 (see Figure 3). Note that for K > bK; the retailers have to pay a transfer to the supplier to
fulll its participation constraint.
If the monopoly industry outcome cannot be sustained because of unilateral deviation, i.e.
K < eK; the equilibrium wholesale prices are implicitly given by:
D
 
wT (K) ; wBR(wT (K))
 K = 1
2
 

 
wT (K) ; wT (K)
 K ;
which implies the following equilibrium wholesale prices:
wT (K) =
42   63 + 4 + 5 + 2
q
K(8  8 + 3)2(2  32 + 4)
(4  2   2)2 .
We get slotting allowances if:
K > bK 0 := 2(wT (K)  c)Di(P (wT (K) ; wT (K))).
This is an equilibrium as long as the respective industry prot exceeds K, which holds for all
K < K
0
. The critical value K
0
is given by 

w

K
0
; w

K
0
= K
0
.
no equilibrium
slotting allowances
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
EM
K
K
K
v K v
wM,FM > 0
wM,FM < 0
wTÝKÞ < wM
0 < F < FM
FM < F < 0
wTÝKÞ < wM
K
K
Figure 3: Equilibria under Non-linear Tari¤s
Based on our results, we assess the impact of the xed costs on retail prices (see Figure
4). We nd that the implications of K are less severe the more di¤erentiated the products are
16
whenever downstream monopolization is feasible. Otherwise, we obtain similar results as under
linear contracts.
>50%25-50%10-25%<10%0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
EÝwTÝ0Þ,wTÝ0ÞÞ
K
K
K
Figure 4: Comparison of Retail Prices for K > 0 and K = 0
under Non-linear Tari¤s
6 Discussion
Our results are derived under various assumptions, which we discuss in the following.
Public vs. Secret Contracts. The previous analysis relies critically on the ability of a
given retailer to observe the details of its rival retailers contract. Otherwise, suppliers had an
incentive to behave opportunistically to the detriment of downstream retailers. Under secret
contracts, wholesale prices, therefore, equal marginal cost of production and xed fees are used
to cover the xed cost. The existence of an equilibrium is only guaranteed for K <  (c; c). It
follows that xed costs have no impact on retail prices with secret two-part tari¤s. In the linear
tari¤scase, the analysis is unchanged because opportunistic behavior of the common upstream
rm is not an issue.
Cournot Competition. So far, we have assumed that the downstream rms compete in
prices. Thereby, the best response to an increasing price of the rival is to charge a higher price
in equilibrium, i.e., prices are strategic complements.18 Previous literature on vertical delegation
18See Vives (1999) for a characterization of the conditions under which rmsdecisions are strategic complements
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is based on this strategic complementarity (Bonanno and Vickers 1988, Rey and Stiglitz 1988,
Sha¤er 1991 and Caillaud and Rey 1995 for a review of this literature). In contrast to their
ndings, our results with regard to the anti-competitive e¤ects are robust to the nature of
downstream competition. Particularly, we can show that they also hold when downstream
decisions are strategic substitutes.
Consider the same industry structure as above and a simple linear demand for perfect sub-
stitutes with P (Q) = 1   Q, where Q = q1 + q2 indicates the sum of quantities o¤ered in the
downstream market. As previously, we assume c = 0. Both retailers maximize their prots by
setting a quantity qi = (1   2wi + wj)=3, for i = 1; 2, j 6= i. The equilibrium wholesale prices
under linear contracts are given by wL(K) = 12(1 
p
1  6K). We get that wL(K) is larger than
the monopoly wholesale price which is wM = 1=4 for K > bK := 1=8. The existence of equilibria
is guaranteed for K < K := 2=9.
In the case of two-part tari¤ contracts, we get monopolization of the industry prot for
K  eK := 7=72. For K < eK, we obtain:19
wT (K) =  1 + 3
2
r
1
2
+ 2K.
Furthermore, the comparison of wholesale prices shows that the selected supplier pays slotting
allowances for all K < bK := 1=8. Figure 5 depicts the equilibrium wholesale prices under
or substitutes for both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
19We get wBRj (wi) = 0 for any wi:
18
Cournot competition for linear contracts and two-part tari¤ contracts.
0.05 0.20
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
K K EMK
wLÝKÞ
wTÝKÞ
wM
wholesale
prices
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Figure 5: Equilibrium Wholesale Prices under Cournot
Competition
7 Conclusion
The literature on vertical contracting suggests that upstream xed costs do not a¤ect the market
outcome. This is true for the case of an upstream monopolist that contracts with two competing
(di¤erentiated) downstream rms under complete information. The supplier can specify two-part
tari¤s with xed fees that are set so as to extract all the downstream surplus, while wholesale
prices are used to maximize industry prots. Hence, the contracting outcome is independent
of the suppliers xed costs. A similar reasoning applies to linear tari¤s. As the supplier aims
at maximizing its prot, upstream xed costs do not a¤ect the market outcome as long as the
upstream prots are large enough to cover the xed costs.20 In contrast to the existing literature,
this article o¤ers an alternative view. Upstream xed costs may help to dampen downstream
competition and as a result consumer surplus may decrease.
Considering a vertical setting with a perfectly competitive upstream market and assuming
that vertical contracting is based on two-part tari¤s, upstream xed costs may enable competing
20 In the case of two upstream rms contracting with a downstream monopolist, market outcomes are also
independent of upstream xed costs in both vertical contracting forms (i.e. two-part tari¤s or linear tari¤s).
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(di¤erentiated) downstream rms to monopolize the market. The reason is that upstream xed
costs induce the retailers to buy from a common supplier. This enables each of them to avoid
bearing the entire xed cost, which would be the case when contracting with an alternative
supplier. Even if the retailers incentive to deviate with an alternative supplier in order to free-
ride on the contract of its competing retailer still remains an issue, we show that a su¢ ciently
high xed cost do not allow for such a deviation. As a consequence, monopolization of the
industry is an equilibrium for a high enough xed cost in two-part tari¤ contracting. For a lower
xed cost, retail prices are still larger than in the absence of xed costs because contracting with
an alternative supplier is always more costly than contracting with the same supplier.
In the case of linear tari¤s, retail prices are also increasing in the upstream xed cost. The
reason is that wholesale prices have to increase in the xed upstream cost in order to enable
the upstream rm of covering its cost since there are no xed fees allowing to redistribute rents
between the downstream and the upstream rms. In sum, upstream xed costs raise retail prices
when there is both intra- and interbrand competition.
Our results imply that upstream xed costs which may result from various regulations such
as consumer protection policies, are neither neutral for retail pricing nor less worrisome than
other changes in marginal costs. To the contrary, the predicted outcome can be even more
detrimental to nal consumers than changes in marginal costs. In our setting, rising marginal
costs lead to higher retail prices without changing the intensity of downstream competition. The
existence of upstream xed costs, instead, may enable the monopolization of the downstream
market. Accordingly, the potential benets of various regulations implying xed upstream costs
are less clear than expected from a consumer perspective. Our analysis provides a framework
which can be used to test empirically these impacts.
20
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